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RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY, MIGRATION
AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
– THE CASE OF HUNGARY IN 1990–1999
by
ZSOMBOR CSERES-GERGELY
Abstract
Mobility in Hungary is a relatively infrequent phenomenon of which
we have mostly aggregate-level information. I use settlement- and
individual level data to show a more elaborate picture of the
Hungarian population moving house across settlements and regions
between 1990 and 1999. Along with giving an aggregate overview of
mobility in the decade, characteristics of the mobile population is
described. Using a simple economic model, I estimate the probabilities
of moving house both from aggregate and individual data, and look at
its response to economic incentives given by geographic differences in
wages and unemployment.
The findings show two main results. Firstly, the flow of people does
follow wage and unemployment differences as expected, although
exact parameter estimates vary in different models. Secondly, the
findings show considerable heterogeneity on the individual level that
prompts caution in extending results from simple local models to large
distance or cross-border migration. Clear signs of the dominant
change in mobility, a strong suburban development, is apparent that
goes right against local labour market benefits.
CSERES-GERGELY ZSOMBOR
MIGRÁCIÓ, MOBILITÁS ÉS A GAZDASÁGI ÖSZTÖNZŐK HATÁSA
MAGYARORSZÁGON 1990 ÉS 1999 KÖZÖTT
Összefoglaló
Magyarországon a migráció összehasonlításban ritka esemény az embe-
rek életében, melyről jobbára makroszintű információkkal rendelkezünk.
Ebben az írásban település és egyéni szintű adatok segítségével írom le az
1990 és 1999 között települések és régiók között mozgó magyar népessé-
get.  Az évtizedben lezajlott mobilitás fő trendjeinek leírása után bemuta-
tom a mobil népesség jellemzőit. Egy egyszerű közgazdasági modellre
építve mind aggregált, mind egyéni adatok segítségével megbecsülöm a
településváltással járó költözés valószínűségét befolyásoló tényezők hatá-
sát, különös tekintettel a gazdasági ösztönzőkre, melyeket a bérek és mun-
kanélküliség közelít.
Az elemzésnek két fő eredménye van.  Először is, a mobiltás iránya követi
a gazdasági ösztönzőknek a bérek és munkanélküliség által megjelenített
hatását, noha a vonatkozó együtthatók becslése nem mindig kellően pon-
tos. Másodszor azonban az egyének szintjén igen nagy heterogenitás mu-
tatkozik a mobilitási döntések motivációjában, ami óvatosságra int az
eredmények extrapolációjában. Világosan jelentkezik a gazdasági ösztön-
zőknek látszólag ellentmondó szuburbanizáció hatása is, ami rámutat an-
nak fontosságára, hogy a mobilitás különféle formáit elkülönítve és ösz-
szefüggésében kezeljük.
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11 Introduction
In the 1990 the economy of Hungary was transformed from a post-socialist to
a market economy. The GDP of the country fell sharply from its pre-transition
level, and only gradually recovered thereafter. In parallel the structure of the
economy changed dramatically. Previously favoured and developed indus-
tries collapsed on the one hand, foreign direct investment created previously
nonexistent ones on the other. Both processes followed a distinctive geograph-
ical pattern, favouring mostly regions of the country that have already been de-
veloped or survived the transformation the best. Clustering of both destruction
and construction of economic activity widened the already sizeable differences
between regions of the country.
In what follows I examine the extent to which geographic mobility of
people reacted to these differences. Given that there does not exist much eco-
nomic literature on this topic concerning Hungary, here I establish the major
facts and mechanics relating to the 1990s in a way that is comparable to the
international literature. Stylised facts of aggregate mobility and the trends
that characterise the 1990s are shown firstly. Secondly an empirical and the-
oretical motivation, based on individual decisions, is given to the empirical
analysis. Next I estimate mobility probabilities at the aggregate level. To give
an understanding of migrants’ characteristics and to employ a richer estima-
tion framework, I turn to micro-level survey data. After a description of the
migrant population, I estimate outmigration probabilities for individuals.
The main results are the following:
1. Whereas mobility, defined as the change of address outside a settlement,
is an infrequent event in international comparison, migration through
borders of regions happens quite often. This feature was not possible to
study in depth and needs further analysis (see point 4).
2. Stylised facts and both aggregate and individual regression models show
that in the first and second half of the 1990s, there are two well defined
regimes in the movement of people. The first is characterised by mainly
mobility towards benefits that labour markets offer, while the second
by movements towards suburban areas. Standard human capital models
work as expected, better in the first half of the decade and for part of
the population that did not follow the “move out and commute back”
strategy. Although labour market driven mobility weakened over time,
the resulting state seems to be dependent on the current distribution of
economic possibilities and might change if new possibilities open up.
23. Notwithstanding the above peculiarities, the relevant population shows
characteristics familiar from the literature of migration. People who
move are predominantly young, who are either about to start or already
have started a family. Level of education, especially college degree is
have a strong impact on migration propensity. Decomposition of the
population showed however, that it is important do differentiate per-
manent and temporary movers. Although members of the latter group
might stay at the new place of living for a longer period, many of them
is driven by motives, such as schooling, that are easy to confound with
economic motives in a less broad sense.
4. Even with relatively stabilised residential patterns, the data demand of
in depth analysis of mobility or migration is high. In the Hungarian case
however, with a structural change proceeding, these demands are even
higher. Moreover, the currently available data does not allow the evalu-
ation of the effect of distance on the migration motive. These problems
are expected to be rectified by the possible release of data from the 2000
Census (not yet available).
2 Macro-level processes of mobility in the 1990s
Hungary is characterised by regional differences that are not only considerable
in magnitude, but are also fairly persistent (see Köllo˝ (2002), for example).
Figure 1 on page 4 shows the evolution of inequality in two key indicators,
unemployment and average wage between NUTS 4 micro-regions, measured
as the coefficient of variation. It is remarkable how similar trends they show.
Before 1992 there are no great changes in labour market inequality, but be-
ginning with 1995, it increases steadily both in terms of unemployment and
wages only with a slight setback in 1998. Analysis of the changes in labour
demand showed that it is not post-socialist slowdown, but economic upswing
that shapes the developments of inequality.
In 1991, the GDP dropped by more than 10 percent over one year and
continued to decline for another two. This contraction hit hard almost the
whole of the economy as it marked the start of a comprehensive and painful
restructuring process. Previous markets collapsed, the institutional environ-
ment changed and several tens of thousands of jobs were destroyed as a res-
ult. Beginning with 1994, GDP growth resumes to overcome the pre-transition
level over the following five years. Even though the contraction in the first half
of the decade affected different regions and groups of people differently ac-
3cording to their association with unsuccessful business, growth was even more
selective. Established firms could skim the cream, the young and well-trained
individuals from the pool of workers. The earnings of these increased well
beyond that of the less fortunate and through the sustained growth of busi-
nesses also demand for additional work-force was generated. It is therefore
the structure of both the collapse and the following development that seems to
explain the sustained geographic differences.
Economic theory predicts that there can not be uncompensated price dif-
ferences between markets on the long run, as it will be arbitrated away. In
case of the labour market, this is realised through the transportation of use-
ful human and non-human assets, mobility of workers and firms. As we have
already noted, the regional patterns in the establishment seem to have left
room for workers to exploit the regional differences through migration. Nev-
ertheless, the share of geographically mobile population does not track closely
inequality indicators. The second panel of Figure 1 on the next page shows
that it follows two pattern over the decade. Falling by one percentage point
at the beginning of the period1, it increases and stays at a higher levela after
1994. Maybe not a great change in magnitude, the first period brings a signi-
ficant drop considering the level of departure. Looking at the other indicators,
this behaviour is not at odds with previous experience.
As emphasised by Bentolila (1997), migration propensity typically falls
with the weakening of the economy. Idiosyncratic shocks might open up gaps
between rewards in different places, but the overall uncertainty increases the
risk associated with migration as such. After 1995 however mobility rate stays
at an approximately constant level of 4 percent, which does not fit the uncer-
tainty explanation. The substantial increase in both inequality and economic
performance suggests that overall migration propensity should have increased
steadily, as the former had generated incentives while the latter reduced ag-
gregate uncertainty hence a possibly important part of the costs of migration.
Before proceeding to the decomposition of aggregate processes, a clarific-
ation of terms is in order. Geographic mobility and migration is not the same
phenomenon. While the former refers to any change of address, migration is
understood as mobility crossing boundaries of large geographic units such as
regions, countries or continents. In what follows, I will define migration this
way and mobility as a change of address across settlements. Wherever it is
possible, I point out differences between results using one or the other defin-
ition. Suiting most of the cases better, I will use the term “mobility”, as it
always subsumes migration, where it is not true the other way around. Nev-
1As inequality indicators could not be computed, years before 1993 are omitted.
4Figure 1: Evolution of regional labour market inequality indicators (coefficient
of variation of unemployment and earnings across NUTS 4 micro-regions),
overall GDP and the share of geographically mobile population over 1993-
1999
5ertheless it turns out that with the data available, focusing on one or the other
will not change conclusions considerably in the case of Hungary, although it
does matter in international comparison.
Böheim and Taylor (1999) quotes previous studies showing that the pro-
portion of the population changing address in the UK was 7 and 11 percent in
the 1960s and the 1970s. A more recent analysis by van der Gaag and van Wissen
(2001) presents figures suggesting that the long-term rate of geographic mobil-
ity is around 13 percent in Sweden and 11 percent in the Netherlands, figures
that are very similar to the UK case. Reaching at most the half or third of
these numbers, Hungarian mobility rate shown in Table 1 on the following
page appears to be quite moderate.
To look at migration rates, I use aggregate data from issues of the Hun-
garian Demographic Yearbook Hungarian Central Statistical Office (1998) to
calculate migration rates at the level of counties and two definitions of larger
regions.2 The first provides me with 20 counties including the capital sep-
arately, the second and the third giving seven and eight units, respectively.3
Using counties gives a units with approximately 500 thousand, while regions
around 1.3 million inhabitants on average. The most significant difference
between the two region definitions is that the official categorisation (corres-
ponding to NUTS 2 regions) does not separate the capital from county Pest,
its greatest neighbour, and uses a coarser division of the eastern part of the
country that the alternative one.
The trend of the above indices are very similar to that of mobility, with
peaks at the beginning of the period and after a decline until 1994, returning to
the vicinity of their 1993 level. The absolute numbers are however lower than
in the case of mobility, as expected. In 1990 a little more than 2.5 percent of
the population crossed the boundaries of counties, a rate decreasing to about
2 percent by the end of the decade. A surprising fact is that employing the
2As many people change their address within a given geographic area, the larger this area, the
lower is in general the probability of exit. Because of this, migration rates are quite sensitive to
the number and size of chosen basic geographic unit.
3NUTS 2 regions are: Central Hungary (Budapest and Pest county), Central Transdanu-
bia (Fejér, Komárom-Esztergom, Veszprém counties), Western Transdanubia (Gyo˝r-Moson-
Sopron, Vas, Zala counties), Southern Transdanubia(Baranya, Somogy, Tolna counties), Northern
Hungary(Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Heves, Nógrád counties), Northern Great Plain (Hajdú-Bihar,
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok, Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg counties), Southern Great Plain (Bács-Kiskun,
Békés, Csongrád counties). The “alternative” regions are: Budapest, Eastern Transdanubia (Pest,
Komárom-Esztergom, Fejér, Veszprém counties), Western Transdanubia (Gyo˝r-Moson-Sopron,
Vas, Zala counties), Southern Transdanubia (Baranya, Somogy, Tolna counties), Region Between
the Danube and Tisza Rivers (Bács-Kiskun, Csongrád counties), Great Plain (Békés, Hajdú-Bihar,
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok counties), Heves and Nógrád Counties, Borsod and Szabolcs Counties.
6Table 1: Migration and mobility rates in Hungary during the 1990s, selected
years
Migration Mobility
County Alt. Regions NUTS 2 All Permanent
1990 2.58 2.30 1.89 4.58 2.06
1992 2.12 1.88 1.50 3.92 1.98
1993 2.07 1.83 1.43 3.82 2.02
1996 2.19 1.94 1.44 4.19 2.05
1998 2.17 1.91 1.42 4.16 2.22
2000 2.09 1.84 1.36 4.05
Source: Own calculations from the respective volumes of the Demographic Handbook of Hungary
Hungarian Central Statistical Office (1998).
non-official regional categorisation (as opposed to using counties) decreases
the migration rates only slightly, by 0.28 percentage point (12 percent). This
either suggests an unlikely event of traffic clustered close to the border of
regions, or the more plausible one that a large proportion of people changing
home go far once they get started. Switching to the official regions yields
another substantial drop, driving down the migration rate from 1.89 percent to
1.36 percent over a decade. As we shall see later, this change is largely due to
the fact that this definition does not combine county Pest and the capital into
a single region.
When comparing results from different indices, we have to note that more
than half of the people finding a new home have crossed the boundaries of
counties. In stark contrast to mobility rates, this number is surprisingly large
also in international comparison. Citing again van der Gaag and van Wissen
(2001), NUTS 2 migration rate4 increased from 1.8 percent to 2.1 percent
over the 1990s in Sweden and was around 2.5 percent in the Netherlands.
Jackman and Savouri (1992) reports that the corresponding figure in the UK
was around 4.2 percent at the beginning of the 90s. As opposed to mobility, the
level of migration can be regarded comparable to and even high with European
standards.
Moving to the regional level, a similar picture appears with the Hungarian
4The authors call this measure a “Crude Migration Rate” to contrast it to one that is standard-
ised to filter out differences in the age structure. We unfortunately do not have sufficient data do
perform standardisation.
7figures contrasting to a 1.6 to 1.8 percent reported for the above countries.
These show that in terms of migration, Hungary appears to be more similar to
western Europe than to its peers. The relevant parts of Table 1 in Huber (2002),
page 18 is reproduced here in Table 2 on the next page for convenience.5 This
shows that in contrast to other Central and Eastern European countries the
Hungarian numbers are all very large, regardless of the classification we use.
2.1 Changes in the structure of mobility at the level of set-
tlements
Behind the relatively stable aggregate time series, the pattern of mobility is
not constant. As a first comparison, I repeat the exercise of Kertesi (1997) and
relate net population gains as a fraction of population for the whole 1980s, to
the periods 1990-1994, 1995-1999 and the whole 1990-1999. Correlations of
these measures presented in Table 3 are moderate and positive in both cases.
There is a declining trend however that confirms the findings of both Kertesi
(1997) and Kupiszewski et al. (2001) indicating signs of a structural change in
the pattern of mobility.
The weakening similarity in the mobility structure comprises differences
on the level of regions and settlements. Looking at positions by net gain on
a regional level reveals that the greatest change over time was the decrease
in the Central Region’s gain of population. The position of other regions has
changed too, but shows no distinct pattern. As regional aggregation can hide
many important details, I move right to the settlement level. The top panel of
Table 4 on page 10 shows mobility to, the bottom from types of settlements
as absolute numbers and as shares from a given year’s total flow. Behind the
changes of the mobility rate, the structure of the flows shows a continuous
transformation.
Although the transition between them is fairly smooth, the endpoints identify
two distinct regimes in mobility. In the beginning of the period, large towns
gain the most population, the capital Budapest being the most outstanding.
County-centres and villages in the upper population bracket are also gainers,
but all other settlements lose population. This pattern suggest a dominating
process of urbanisation, a legacy of the former development path of Hungary
and indeed many European countries.
5Huber reports “. . . the percentage of population which changed region of residence in 1993
in the CEE and in selected EU member states.” The definition of these figures is thus compatible
with mine. Although settlement structure, population distribution and various other factors render
comparison nontrivial, mean population sizes give an idea to which Hungarian categorisation the
numbers are comparable.
8Table 2: Migration rates in selected member and candidate countries of the
European Union.
Year Average
region pop-
ulation
(thousand)
Gross Migration
Rate
Netherlands 1993 1260.6 1.64
1995 1308.9 1.62
Italy 1983 2828.8 0.64
1995 2828.3 0.28
Spain 1983 2003.5 0.66
1994 2059.0 0.52
Poland 1992 783.0 0.72
1998 789.1 0.44
Slovenia 1996 165.9 0.14
1998 165.2 0.15
Slovakia 1992 0.43
1995 0.31
Czech Rep.
Okresy (76) 1992 137.5 1.08
1998 137.3 0.87
NUTS 2 (14) 1992 736.8 0.68
1998 735.4 0.56
Kraje (8) 1992 1289.4 0.56
1998 1286.9 0.47
Reproduction of parts of Table 1 in Huber (2002), page 18.
9Table 3: Correlation of net mobility rates across time periods
1980-1990 1990-1999 1990-1994 1995-1999
1980-1990 1.00
1990-1999 0.48 1.00
1990-1994 0.44 0.83 1.00
1995-1999 0.34 0.81 0.34 1.00
Source: own calculations from the TSTAR database and a 1% sample of the 1980 and 1990
Censuses.
Without inter-settlement or inter-regional data, we can not say reliably
more about the direction of mobility flows starting from a given type of settle-
ment (see Appendix A.1 on page 40 on the data available for aggregate ana-
lysis). Nevertheless, we rely on parts of the thorough demographic study of ag-
gregate mobility and migration in 1997 and 1987 by Kupiszewski et al. (2001)
already mentioned above. The authors provide a description of many import-
ant details, including flows between different types of settlements within re-
gions. Their analysis identifies the process of urbanisation and provides fur-
ther supporting evidence for it. On the aggregate level, the analysis finds pat-
terns of flows in 1987 and before that are similar to what the tables above show
in the case of the early 1990s. This confirms that the urbanisation pattern we
see on a year-to year basis is the end of a longer process.
By the second half of the decade the picture changes and ranks in terms of
net mobility gains reverse. From being the greatest gainer, Budapest becomes
the greatest loser among all settlements, having a greater negative balance by
2000 in absolute terms than its gain was in 1990. A steady decrease in both
in- and outflow accompanies this change that decreases until 1994, but jumps
back to its 1990 level thereafter and stays fairly stable. Although with the
process shifted by around 1-2 years, county centres show similar behaviour.
The remaining set of towns is divided, as the larger and smaller ones turn
to gainers from losers, but the ones in the middle lose from their population
almost throughout the decade. Some towns may gain considerably, but real
winners are clearly the villages. The largest ones gain steadily, almost 10
thousand people a year but even the smallest could reverse their position and
back up their population to more than the starting level.6
6This of course does not preclude an increasing heterogeneity within these categories. Indeed,
there are quite a few small villages losing large proportions of the population through death and
10
Table 4: In- and outwards mobility by settlement types and population cat-
egories 1990-1999 (absolute numbers and shares in total flow, categories by
settlement types and population brackets)
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Inwards mobility
Budapest 81000 60441 43606 56256 53513 45390
17 15 12 13 13 11
County 86240 76902 64420 72263 69956 61845
centres 18 19 18 17 17 15
Towns 58239 52299 48430 55396 53547 52120
20000– 12 13 13 13 13 13
Towns 44193 37679 35004 42103 40111 38569
10000–20000 9 9 10 10 10 10
Towns 26746 22841 20827 25543 24956 26023
–10000 6 6 6 6 6 6
Villages 25934 22941 23802 28727 29783 31269
5000– 5 6 7 7 7 8
Villages 64962 55630 53248 64369 65010 67102
2000–5000 14 14 15 15 15 17
Villages 45684 38520 36475 42986 43914 44742
1000–2000 10 10 10 10 10 11
Villages 41633 36855 33630 38454 39114 37919
–1000 9 9 9 9 9 9
Together 474631 404108 359442 426097 419904 404979
100 100 100 100 100 100
Outwards mobility
Budapest 69249 57139 52186 64236 64066 63766
15 14 15 15 15 16
County 85586 72199 61340 77341 75211 72912
centres 18 18 17 18 18 18
Towns 60932 51098 44981 55267 53995 51441
20000– 13 13 13 13 13 13
Towns 45777 39836 35540 41375 40615 38048
10000–20000 10 10 10 10 10 9
Towns 27881 23384 21379 24471 24201 22790
–10000 6 6 6 6 6 6
Villages 25488 21745 19634 24262 23950 23417
5000– 5 5 5 6 6 6
Villages 65667 57751 52108 58557 58183 56744
2000-5000 14 14 14 14 14 14
Villages 47349 41079 36939 41352 41032 39844
1000–2000 10 10 10 10 10 10
Villages 46702 39905 35323 39166 38651 36017
–1000 10 10 10 9 9 9
Together 474631 404136 359430 426027 419904 404979
100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: own calculations from the TSTAR database.
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One of the most important changes between the two periods highlighted
by Kupiszewski et al. (2001) is the source of the change in net gains of regions
and settlement types. Whereas in 1987 the most popular “routes” were those
from villages to towns and especially Budapest, this has reversed by 1997.
During the 90s a new trend, counter-urbanisation took over. As a reason for
this, the authors identify suburban development and agglomeration using flow
data between settlements. Although flow to suburbs was already higher in the
1980s than to many central settlements, this process continued even further in
the 90s and became finally dominant.
To complement the numeric description, we can turn to a visual display of
the situation in both periods. The maps of Figure 4 on page 48 and Figure 5 on
page 49 in Appendix B show the relative average gains in population for two
representative periods in the beginning and the end of the period — between
1990-1992 and 1998-2000. In addition Figure 3 on page 47 shows an outline
map to help identification of agglomeration centres, and Table 16 on page 44
lists the actual relative gains for settlements in these centres.
The map of Figure 4 on page 48 depicts the relative average gains from
mobility in 1990-1993. Black and dark grey colouring represents those with
an overall gain, while light gray or white indicates those who lose population
through mobility. Looking at the doughnut-shaped dark areas, it is apparent
that already this early period is characterised by a distinctive pattern. Centres
of suburban development7 are usually among gainers. Some of them are sur-
rounded by a rim of settlements that gain even more than they do, some with
a rim that gains less. Being unable to separate the actual pairs of flows behind
the numbers, we can hypothesise two dominant mechanics on the aggregate
data that can create such pattern.
In the era of urbanisation, it might be difficult for a migrant to reach the
final target at once. This can make it necessary to include a stop before reach-
ing it and settle in a temporary residence. It is possible from the outer rim
to commute to the town, but costs of living are probably lower as agricultural
activity is still possible and accommodation might be cheaper or available.
Once established, the migrant might chose to move forward, which generates
a population gain for the town itself.
Suburbanisation is a different process. While people moving into a town
are seeking economic opportunities, those moving out might already enjoy
that (see Mieszkowski and Mills (1993) for an introduction). These people
use their wealth to move away from the centre to seek a more pleasant place
unbalanced mobility.
7This classification was created by the Hungarian Central Statistics Office.
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of living, but commute back to work. Another type of migrant moving out
of the town is that discouraged by the costs of urban living. Having possibly
been a “two-stage” migrant, those unsuccessful are moving back to previous
places of residence. This can be the place they originally came from or the
first stage.
Being different, these two regimes might follow each other easily in time,
possibly alternating. Suppose that the underlying factor that attracts migrants
is business activity, that produces employment opportunities and favourable
wages, but also disamenities, such as pollution, crowd and possibly in-migrants
themselves. If people look for amenities but want to take advantage of eco-
nomic opportunities, it is easy to imagine a situation where there is a constant
flow of migrants into and from a city with quite different composition.
Despite of its qualitative similarity, the situation changes dramatically by
the second half of the decade. As already seen in Table 4 on page 10, Fig-
ure 5 on page 49 shows that large towns’ gain turns to a loss in some years
with a rim around them that thrives even more than before. If we think of mo-
bile people in terms of the two stories outlined above, it seems likely that the
former balance has shifted considerably and the majority of prospective urban
dwellers has been offset by those moving out to the suburbs.
There might be at least two reasons for this. It might be the case that the
“escalator mechanism” of the city does not work any more (up to the previous
efficiency) and there are possibly new ways of organisation and technologies
that allow people to enjoy the benefits of a city without suffering from its
disamenities. In the case of Hungary, the selectively favourable effect of the
economic upswing (favouring the well-educated) and the massive relocation
of manufacturing industries to the countryside provide example for the first set
of forces. The second set includes the development of mobile communication,
flexible working hours and the beginning of large residential developments
around larger towns. Anecdotal evidence also suggests the possible import-
ance of “postmodern” transformation of values emphasising natural living.
This is however hard to tell apart from the effect of increased affluence.
3 Empirical and theoretical motivation
There exist a variety of theoretical models to explain driving forces behind
migration (see Akkoyounlu and Vickerman (2002) for a brief survey). Differ-
ing in sophistication and additional considerations, they are all based on the
same arbitrage argument, where an agent or a set of agents decide about relo-
cating their human capital among more favourable conditions if these appear.
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The most frequently used approach, often labelled as the “human capital ap-
proach” is built on a micro-level decision that relates actual utility to expected
returns of the change, net of costs.8 Besides the strictly labour-market related
reasons, there can be other ones to move. People are randomly allocated to
a birthplace and they simply might not like it. They might aim to move to a
final destination and stay “in the middle” just for a while, but maybe for years.
Demographic changes such as marriage, death or, childbirth can play an im-
portant part. Since not every opportunity is available locally, schooling can be
an important factor in migration. And finally migration itself can “back-fire”
and trigger yet another move if a previous one was unsuccessful.
Note that although I referred to migration here, the above motives can be
true for relocation within any distance. Even if somebody does not go out of a
town, moving house can be a substantial change requiring calculus in terms of
costs and benefits similar to a longer range migration decision. These might
be different both in magnitude and the way they exert their effect, but we have
no reason to suppose that the underlying mechanics are different. However,
changes in costs and benefits are probably discontinuous or at least highly
nonlinear. Stepping out of one’s well known cultural and physical surrounding
can change everyday experience from “familiar” to “completely different” by
crossing the boundary of a geographic unit.
We might also think about generalising the mechanics to the other direc-
tion, to migration that spans countries or continents. The fact that the literat-
ure on this issue does not bring about extra considerations on the individual
decision is encouraging (see for example the comprehensive paper of Borjas
(1994)), but direct extensions should be probably avoided. In simple mod-
els which are the only estimable ones on all but highly specialised datasets,
we are already forced to sidestep the above mentioned nonlinearities or insert
some kind of a distance measure as a proxy. It is thus very unlikely that a
parsimonious empirical specification can be general enough to allow for such
flexibility.
3.1 Individual attitudes towards mobility
Beside individual characteristic and a host of other information, the Regional
Development Survey conducted by the market research company Szonda Ipsos
elicited motives to move house (for further details see the Data Appendix A).
8The other branch, started by Jackman and Savouri (1992) adapts this idea to the use of recent
technology and supposes that agents migrate only if they already have a job offer. Although this
idea is appealing, using it requires data on job engagements that I do not have access to.
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Unfortunately since the survey was not specially designed to study migration,
the elicited reasons do not cover a complete set of possibilities. Neverthe-
less, they include some motivations that are plausible in the given socioeco-
nomic setting.9 The first three columns of Table 5 shows the proportion of
respondents mentioning different reasons among those moved between 1986
and 1990, between 1991 and 1994 and after or in 1995.
Among the motives, poor labour market conditions in previous place of
living is one of the most important reasons to move house. Similarly import-
ant reasons include regional amenities such as access to facilities and pleasant
surrounding. High growth in mentioning “too expensive” and “paying util-
ity bills” is notable, suggesting that beside working conditions and amenities,
financial pressure associated with a place of residence is an important issue.
There is a decreasing incidence of mentioning “man made” features of the sur-
rounding and an increase in natural ones. Even the importance of transport-
ation is falling. Comparing these factors with aggregate figures of mobility,
these appear to be in line with sub- or counter-urbanisation, but the picture is
far from being clear.
The only way here to isolate migrants from the pool of mobile people is to
constraint the population to those who moved across counties. This operation
however yields so little cell sizes that are impossible to evaluate. The remark-
able exceptions were the role of labour market motivations and moving back
close to family. Compared to the unrestricted ones, values for the former in-
crease uniformly by around 6 percentage points, becoming the second, while
the latter increases to 50 percent in almost all periods, being clearly the single
most often mentioned reason (figures not shown in table). Unfortunately we
do not know the labour market status of the migrant nor whether she or he was
a temporary one. If so, the proportion of students is likely to be high among
them.
Information is also available on the perceived success rates for each type of
motivation, although these are so high with so little variance10 that they hardly
convey any information. Nevertheless we note that unsatisfactory working
conditions, the prime reason to move, have been succesfully improved in about
9These exclude many basic ones like marriage, divorce, own studies. Later however we will
see that these people are most likely to be ones who permanently settled in the new place and the
most problematic non-elicited motive for mobility and migration, studies, is not of great import-
ance among them.
10Quesions were similar to the motivation one, but asking “To what extent do you feel that your
expectations were fulfilled in this respect?”. Scores vary between 60 and 93 percent in the first –
except for 22 for “too expensive” in 1986-1990 – and between 92 and 98 percent in the second
block of questions.
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Table 5: Reasons playing a role in mobility
% saying “yes” Factor loadings
70s 80s 90s “aggressive” “defensive”
Life too expensive 5 10 15 -0.09 0.54
Poor job opportunities 28 26 24 0.44 0.04
Problems with paying
utility bills 9 13 18 -0.04 0.53
Condition of the building
was poor 10 12 17 0.15 0.32
Safety in the neighbour-
hood was poor 3 6 7 0.06 0.45
People were too poor 3 5 4 0.22 0.32
Buying rented accom.
helped in moving 3 6 8 -0.01 0.26
Bigger, better flat 35 35 33 0.23 0.36
Schooling facilities 25 24 17 0.78 -0.04
Medical care facilities 24 21 18 0.80 0.04
Shopping 26 23 20 0.85 0.02
Pleasant surrounding,
less pollution 19 23 24 0.04 0.48
Cultural facilities 21 20 15 0.79 -0.01
Good transportation,
not cut off 25 22 20 0.78 0.05
Back to relatives 37 36 36 -0.02 0.02
Source: Own calculations from the Regional Development Survey of Szonda Ipsos. Cell sizes are
above 37, except for “Safety was poor” and “People were poor”.
87 percent on average in every period. This is a high number in both absolute
terms and also relative to others in the list.11
To explore the covariance pattern behind the motives, I performed a factor
analysis. Two factors emerged with an eigenvalue larger than unity. The factor
loadings after varimax rotation are given in columns 4 and 5 of Table 5.
11It might be tempting to draw the conclusion that migration is an extremely effective relief to
labour market difficulties. It is this point however where we need to keep in mind that our sample
contains probably the most successful migrants of all. See Appendix A.3 for details.
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Table 6: Average factor scores by sending and receiving settlement types. (“aggressive”/“defensive”)
Sending Receiving
Budapest County centres Towns Villages Together
Budapest -0.46 0.48 -0.52 0.28 -0.44 0.65 -0.47 0.52
County centres 0.25 -0.34 -0.38 0.18 -0.38 0.13 -0.49 0.67 -0.37 0.37
Towns 0.36 -0.15 0.36 -0.23 -0.26 0.07 -0.44 0.17 -0.12 0.02
Villages 0.66 0.04 0.92 -0.11 0.49 -0.19 -0.16 -0.10 0.27 -0.11
Together 0.47 -0.10 0.40 -0.04 0.08 -0.03 -0.32 0.21 -0.02 0.08
Source: Own calculations from the Regional Development Survey of Szonda Ipsos. Cell-sizes are above 50, except in the Budapest-county centre
relations.
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The two factors gather motives that are attached to two strategies, which
I term “aggressive” and “defensive” respectively. The first characterises an
upwardly mobile behaviour, seeking better working conditions and man-made
amenities that the place of living can offer. The second one describes a po-
tentially more defensive strategy. People here seem to flee from costs and fin-
ancial pressures, taking advantage of selling previously rented then purchased
accommodation. Man-made labour amenities are not exceptionally valued,
natural ones much more. Labour market possibilities do not pose particular
pressure either. These responses of course can fit two sub-populations. It is
not only the less well off who plan to move out of a town, but also those suc-
cessful, having possibly multiple cars within the family that make distances
manageable. They might express attitudes that seem similar to that of less
fortunate. The two types of strategies suggest a mainly urban and rural type
of lifestyle. To check this intuition, Table 6 on the facing page gives averages
of the two factor scores for those moved after 1989 by types of settlements.
Rows indicate type for sending, columns for receiving settlements.
Table 7: Factor scores by year of relocation
“aggressive” “defensive”
90 0.12 0.01
91 -0.05 0.11
92 0.13 -0.07
93 -0.10 0.10
94 0.00 0.08
95 -0.13 0.16
96 -0.13 0.20
97 0.02 0.19
Source: Own calculations from the Regional Development Survey of Szonda Ipsos.
There is a clear picture emerging from the combinations of the two factors.
Moving upwards in the settlement hierarchy almost always goes together with
a greater “aggressive” motivation on average and the least “defensive” whereas
moving downwards is characterised by the opposite pattern. As aggregate
trend showed decreasing flow of workers from villages to towns but an in-
crease in the other direction, we can conjecture that motivations change as
well over time with the composition of movers. The actual figures are shown
in Table 7 as the averages of both scores by the year of moving house. There
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is no trend in the first, “aggressive” factor although it takes mostly negative
values in the second half of the decade. The second “defensive” on the other
hand shows an increase over time that starts from 1994 and is in line with what
we found so far.
3.2 A simple theoretical model
The previous subsection showed that there are several reasons to migrate be-
side the improvement of labour market conditions. Many of these are non-
economic, although if we consider a broader context, drawing a dividing line
between is not always easy. Nevertheless, we have seen that labour market
opportunities play an important role. In what follows I use a simple, widely
used model to formalise this motivation.
Agents relocate to a new place of living if the total expected discounted
benefits from the move are greater than the costs incurred. Benefits are most
commonly understood as the gains from greater probability of finding a job or
higher wages when the job is found. Costs include direct and indirect costs of
moving, including transportation of possessed items, giving up and finding a
property to live in and the loss of social network. Depending on whether they
are amenities or disamenities, features of places of living might contribute to
the benefit or the cost side. The decision is captured by the index function
mi,j,k = I (U(wi,k , ui,k, Ai,k, i,k), E [U (E[wj,k ], uj,k, Aj,k, i,k)] , Ci,j,k) .
The variable mi,j,k takes the value 1 if person k moves from i to j. Living in i
yields utility12 U(wi,k , ui,k, Ai,k, i,k) while living in j gives expected utility
E [U(E[wj,k], uj,k, Aj,k, Ci,j,k, i,k)], with Ci,j,k being the cost of migration.
The sources of utility are realised and expected wages (wi,k and E[wj,k ]) and
employment opportunities (ui,k, ui,k) in the current and terminal place, along
with amenities that the area can offer (Aj,k, Aj,k). Individual heterogeneity
enters through the stochastic terms, i,k and j,k, whose expected contribu-
tion to the index is zero. Costs (Ci,j,k) include actual costs of moving house,
but also losses coming from leaving a social network or prompting a spouse
to move with possibly no personal reason or even a disutility resulting from
moving.13 This framework can be used to define estimating equations at the
individual and aggregate level.
12This is actually a mixture of an indirect (wages are arguments) and a direct (amenities are
arguments) utility function.
13This is the extent the simple model accommodate the fact that in many cases not individuals,
but households move.
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Assuming separability of utilities and the cost element, and denoting util-
ities in a concise way, the individual probability of moving from i¯ to j¯ is
Pr
[
mi¯,j¯,k = 1|j¯ = j¯
∗
]
= Pr
[
E [U(j¯, k)]− Ci¯,j¯,k ≥ U (¯i, k)|j¯ = j¯∗
]
,
where {j¯ = j¯∗} is equivalent to {E [U(j¯, k)] ≥ E [U(j, k)] ∀j ∈ J}. Note that
the mobility decision is conditional on residence in i¯ and on the characteristics,
therefore the choice of j¯. The decision is therefore understood in two stages.
In the first, the agent considers all possible new places of living and selects
the best among them. In the second, a decision is made about moving to the
selected place, j¯, or not.
A possible empirical specification14 is to suppose full linearity on the left-
hand side and write
Pr[mi¯,j¯,k = 1|j¯ = j¯
∗] = Pr
(
α + β1wi¯,k + β2 E[wj¯,k] + γ1ui¯,k + γ2 E[uj¯,k]
+ δ1Ai¯,k + δ2 E[Aj¯,k] + ηZk ≥ i¯,k + j¯,k
)
, (1)
with E(X) = 0, where X denote the full matrix of regressors and  the sum
of the two disturbances.
Beside the labour market indicators a new term appears in equation (1),
Zk, the set of individual characteristics that influence the migration decision.
These can be connected to the utility term, characterising preference hetero-
geneity that manifests in observables and represents costs elements, such as
loss of social networks and familiar surrounding. Differences in labour mar-
ket possibilities might arise because of temporary imbalances, but might by
compensated by local (dis-) amenities, included in E[Aj¯,k] . Since these are
plentiful and picking the “right one” might be impossible, we would like to
model them as some variety of fixed effects.
Our interest focuses on the β and γ parameters. If the model used is cor-
rect, β2 and γ1 are expected to be positive, while β1 and γ2 negative. If only
differences matter, the β and γ pairs should not be different in expected value.
Beside these expectations, we need to keep attention to the facts learned from
the stylised facts characterising Hungary. Since counter-urbanisation is be-
coming increasingly important and agglomerations do not offer especially fa-
vourable labour market conditions, we are likely to lose the effect of incentives
14We could “derive” this result from a linear specification of utilities and building the estimating
equation from that, as it is often done in the analysis of participation decision. Although does not
make any practical difference, it is much less restrictive to impose linearity as an approximation
to the index function than to suppose it as a feature of the utilities.
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in the estimation phase through averaging individual-specific responses. Para-
meter estimates therefore might be dampened by effects working towards the
opposite direction.
Often data is not available for individuals, but only on a more aggregated
level as number of migrants from one settlement/region to the other. If one
has data on the whole population, then aggregating the decision rule among
all migrants moving from i¯ to j¯, the left-hand side yields the probability of a
transition conditional on the data. A linear parameterisation of this aggregate
relationship with the migration probability from i¯ to j is
Pr[mi¯,j¯,k = 1] = α˜ + β˜1 E[wi¯] + β˜2 E[wj ] + γ˜1 E[ui¯] + γ˜2 E[uj ]
+ δ˜1 E[Ai¯] + δ˜2 E[Aj ] + νi¯,j ,
with E(Xν) = 0, where X denote the full matrix of regressors and ν the
vector of disturbances.
A variant of this formulation is probably the most widely used one for
studying migration (see Fidrmuc and Huber (2002) for a Central European
example). Note that this specification is different from the individual one in
many respects. After aggregation only the expected values of a given settle-
ment’s characteristics enter the equation, both in the sending and in the re-
ceiving settlement. As we did not get the equation from direct aggregation of
the individual rule, including expected individual characteristics is an option,
although not shown here.
Although the structure of the equation is similar to the individual one,
the parameters do not correspond to the same theoretical responses unless the
individual equation is of a linear probability type too, and the specification
is the same — a tilde on the respective parameters indicate this distinction.
The notation j¯ is replaced with j to reflect that on the settlement level it is
meaningful to have nonzero probability towards many destinations. Although
the individual equation is informative only about the probability of leaving
a settlement, aggregation brought back the information on probabilities of a
transition between a pairs of settlements, given the starting point i¯.
In some other cases, information on between-settlement flows is not avail-
able, only on out- and inflow totals. With a further aggregation of the previous
equation, adding up all js that receive people from i, we obtain the overall
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probability of moving out from a given settlement as
Pr[Mi¯,j = 1] = αˇ + βˇ1 E[wi¯] + γˇ1 E[ui¯] + δˇ1 E[Ai¯]
+ βˇ2 E[w|Pr(Mi¯,j = 1) 6= 0] + γˇ2 E[e|Pr(Mi¯,j = 1) 6= 0]
+ δˇ2 E[A|Pr(Mi¯,j = 1) 6= 0] + νˇi¯,j . (2)
In this case, aggregation affected the characteristics of the receiving settle-
ments as well, resulting only the inclusion of the expectation of their overall
characteristics, conditional on the fact that they receive migrants from region
i at all.
4 Evidence from aggregate data
I first estimate the conditional probability of outmigration from a given settle-
ment conditional on the realised destinations. The dependent variable is this
probability without scaling, ie. 0.04 means that 4 percent of the population
has left the small region. The estimating equation (2∗) is a variant of equation
(2).
Pr[Mi¯,j = 1]t = αˇ + βˇ1
̂E[wi¯]t + γˇ1Ê[ui¯]t + D1l + D2t + D1l D2t + νˇi¯,j . (2∗)
Local unemployment rate15 and average wage16 enters the equation. Un-
employment rate is not scaled, so 0.1 represents a 10 percent unemployment
rate. Earnings are measured in thousand forints at 1992 prices.17
Noting that aggregate data suggests the important role of a settlement’s
status and geographic location, I include indicators for the settlement type,
county, year and interaction for all of the pairs of these. Beside amenities
15As the Data Appendix A.4 on page 42 explains, I have two measures for unemployment rate,
but the results are fairly robust to replacing one with the other. The one used to generate the
presented results is based on the population in “active-age”.
16One could argue that average wages are not the appropriate measure here, since the reflect
the composition of workers. For a newly arrived employee, it might be more appropriate to use a
wage measure that is cleaned from this effect. Using simple Mincer-type earnings equations with
indicators for small regions, I have estimated the following models using the indicators instead of
means of earnings. Since results did not change, I decided against this procedure.
17Ideally wages should be deflated by region-specific price-indices, which are not available
in Hungary. Casual observation suggests however that with the appearance of large-scale retail
outlets the between-region price variation of commodities might be relatively small compared to
that within a region. Price data for services, especially housing, on the other hand are very sparse
or nonexistent.
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and common macroeconomic shocks, these indicators are supposed to rep-
resent four more factors. One is the average of relevant individual character-
istics of the sending settlements (E[Ai¯]) and those of the receiving partners
(E[A|Pr(Mi¯,j = 1) 6= 0] with wages E[w|Pr(Mi¯,j = 1) 6= 0] and em-
ployment possiblilities E[e|Pr(Mi¯,j = 1) 6= 0]). The second is the changing
structure of labour demand factors, such as the relocation of the manufactur-
ing industries during the decade. The third is the important infrastructural
development of settlements, especially villages. The fourth is changes in the
housing market.18
A question that might intrigue some is the joint inclusion of unemployment
and wages. The strength of the wage curve in Hungary is well-documented in
Kertesi and Köllo˝ (1998) and this might be worrying from an identification
point of view. In the case of perfect correlation it is of course not possible
to estimate the parameters and even in a weaker case, the estimated standard
errors are “inflated”. Nevertheless, including both is a theoretical necessity. If
we include only one, unemployment rate for example treating it effectively as
a sufficient statistics for labour market conditions, we would confound the two
effects it carries. The estimate obtained this way would be biased downwards
if earnings has the theoretically predicted effect. With including both, high
unemployment measures purely the poor chances of getting a job, without its
depressing effect on wages.
There were two factors influencing the choice of the unit of analysis. One
of them is the characteristics of the underlying process, namely that the pre-
valent counter-urbanisation generates population flows within relatively short
ranges. Since we do not know to which destination someone moving out of a
settlement heads, choosing a unit of observation that is at least as big as the
above range, we risk to register considerable outflow even if there is none.
This suggest taking settlements as the unit of observation. The other factor is
the availability of data. Although we have unemployment figures at that level,
wage data on the level of settlements are nonexistent. For most of the micro-
regions (NUTS 4 level) however, one can produce estimates of average wages
with or without composition effects. This suggests choosing micro-regions
over settlements. Based on the stylised facts of mobility, I believe choosing a
larger unit introduces more substantial problems than a smaller one, therefore
I choose settlements. With this, a measurement error in earnings is introduced
that is expected to artificially drive the parameter on wages towards zero.
To check for this possibility, first I estimated a fixed-effects model. A
18Being theoretically observable, these last three factors should ideally included as regressors.
Unfortunately in practice they are either not observed or not accessible.
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Hausman specification test indicates that after including the extensive set of
indicators, the randomness of the individual effects can not be rejected. For
this reason, I revert to a random-effect model and keep it throughout the ana-
lysis.19 This reduction increases efficiency and is also useful to motivate later
specifications.
The first column of Table 8 gives estimates for the entire period between
1992 and 1999. The parameters have the expected sign, but that of earnings
is significant only at the 10 percent level. The model explains a modest but
significant variation of the data. One has to note however that after including
all the binary indicators, the marginal contribution of the two central variables
is limited.
Table 8: Aggregate estimates of mobility probabilities (outmovers as shares of
population)
1992-1999 1992-1995 1996-1999
Unemployment rate 0.0889∗∗ 0.1115∗∗ 0.1048∗∗
(17.33) (16.83) (15.39)
Average earnings −0.0001∗ −0.0002∗∗ 0.0001
(−1.79) (−2.05) (0.93)
“R2” 0.14 0.18 0.11
N 21, 485 9, 209 12, 276
Data: TSTAR database.
FGLS estimates of a random-effects model with 3070 groups. In all models indicators are in-
cluded for every settlement type, county, year and the paired interaction of these effects with
appropriate omissions.
Heteroskedasticity robust asymptotic “t” statistics are in parentheses to the right of parameters.
In the above estimates I have pooled all observations over the whole dec-
ade. However, aggregate data showed evidence for a change in the migration
process which might result from a change in the role of the drivers themselves.
To investigate this possibility, I re-estimated the model splitting the sample at
1995, the turning point in mobility rate. The results are shown in the second
and third column of Table 8. Estimates for the first period are close to those
obtained from the pooled sample with both key variables being significant, but
the wage parameter in the second is small and insignificant and the effect of
unemployment has decreased somewhat. Although the direct connection is not
apparent, this change does not contradict to the aggregate mobility processes.
19The conclusions of the Hausman test hold also for later specifications.
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Despite the statistical significance of the variables, their economic signific-
ance is mixed. A one percent increase in unemployment rate induces around
0.1% increase in outmigration probability, thus one percentage point gives
a change of 0.001, a small, but meaningful amount, given the spread of the
variables (see Table 15 on page 40 in Appendix B). Considering that unem-
ployment rates vary between 2 and 25 percent in any single year, moving from
the worst to the best place in this respect predicts 2.5 percentage point change
in outmigration rate. Given a range of 5 percentage points, this is not much
but plausible. The effect of earnings is somewhat weaker. A thousand For-
int increase in the average earnings generates a 1 pro mille change. Crossing
the range of average earnings from about 12 to 30 thousand Forints brings a
change of 0.18 percent in outmigration probability.
5 Evidence from individual-level data
Aggregate data can dampen measurement error quite substantially and being
drawn from administrative sources, it is comprehensive. Individual-level ob-
servations however allow us to look at the migration process closer and allow
specifications that may be more plausible than those used at the aggregate
level. As a further benefit, we can inspect and control the composition of the
population at hand to understand and control estimates.
The individual analysis is based on the Regional Development Survey
(RDS) of the market research company Szonda Ipsos and the 1996 Micro-
census (MC) of the Hungarian Central Statistics Office. Both of these data
sources allow us to investigate migration at the individual level but from dif-
ferent angles. Detailed information on the data sets is given in Data Ap-
pendix A.2 on page 41 and 41.
5.1 Geographic patterns of mobility
We have already seen in Section 2 that both the geographic patterns of mobility
and their changes are quite characteristic. Using individual data to obtain
the same information and its derivatives has a double use. Firstly we can
ascertain that the behaviour of the population in the individual data is similar
to the aggregate, so there are no large-scale sampling problems biasing the
results. Secondly, its decomposability helps to understand temporal changes
in the patterns of mobility and differences in the behaviour of typical groups
of people.
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First I use the RDS to look at flows between different types of settlements.
Among all persons in the RDS who changed place of living, 2830 did so after
1986, 1994 after 1989 and 136 in 1997. These two recent changes are of
greatest interest to us. Table 9 on the following page shows the transitions
between types of settlements in three consecutive decades: 90s, 80s and 70s.
Rows represent the type of previous, columns that of the current settlement.
The tendencies are in line with what we see at the aggregate level and hall-
marked by a reverse of rural to urban mobility. Whereas in the 70s and the
80s both the capital and county centres show a positive and villages a negative
balance, this reverses by the 1990s. Despite the possible sample selection is-
sues (see Appendix A.3 on page 41), the implied flows replicate the aggregate
ones quite well.
It is notable that an almost constant one fifth of the relevant population
move horizontally between villages, a phenomenon largely due to the form-
ation of families. The small size of settlements itself makes it more prob-
able that people work or go about some other business outside its boundaries.
Seeking partners from a relatively large pool of persons requires this, match-
ing couples more often from outside the settlement than in the case of a larger
place such as a town.
Up to this point, people who change their address temporarily or perman-
ently were treated together, since neither the settlement-level TSTAR nor the
RDS makes it possible to tell them apart.20 This however might lead to mixing
two characteristically different population. An interesting piece of evidence on
the possible differences between the composition of permanent and tempor-
ary is shown by aggregate data on the seasonality of temporary mobility (see
page 328 in Hungarian Central Statistical Office (1998) for example). After
long periods with equally distributed load, monthly mobility figures peak in
September, when students take their places in dormitories if studying far from
home. In the case of towns but the capital this increases the number of mobile
persons up to five times of its usual level (at around 25 thousand people) and
also in the case of villages the comparable factor reaches four. As a result,
September alone represents more than one fifth of the total mobility flow.
In the MC, we can separate the two types of mobility. A total of 10,585
persons in our sample, amounting to 5.46 percent of the total population have
changed the settlement of living from 1990 to 1996, of which 2536 people (1.3
20Although these definitions are based purely on official categories, they convey relevant in-
formation. Beside the legal obligation to report a place of living, certain benefits from muni-
cipalities are tied to being registered as a permanent resident in a place, such as certain medical
services or living subsidies.
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Table 9: Distribution of mobility flows by settlement types by time of last
move (RDS, percent).
Previous residence Residence in 1997
Budapest County c. Towns Villages Together
1970s
Budapest 0 1 3 2 7
County centre 1 1 2 2 7
Towns 4 6 5 7 22
Villages 4 15 21 23 64
Together 9 24 32 35 100
1980s
Budapest 0 1 3 3 7
County centre 2 2 3 6 14
Towns 4 6 6 10 26
Villages 3 11 18 21 53
Together 9 20 30 40 100
1990s
Budapest 0 1 4 7 13
County centre 2 3 3 9 17
Town 4 5 5 10 24
Village 4 8 13 22 46
Together 9 17 25 48 100
Source: Own calculations from the Regional Development Survey of Szonda Ipsos. Percentages
might not add up due to rounding.
percent) changed only temporary and 8,186 people (4.23 percent) permanent
address too. Given that these figures are cumulated in the MC over six years
through an unknown process, it is hard to judge the representativeness of the
data (for details on the data see Appendix A.2 on page 41). The nature of
the selection however suggests that the proportion of temporary relocations
among all is below the population number of 50 percent.
Although with different actual numbers, flows between types of settle-
ments show similar patterns as experienced in the RDS. There is a well-defined
“path” to small towns and villages, producing an overall loss of Budapest and
county centres. Just as the negative position of large places, one-fifth of the
flow between villages appears too.
Temporary flows on the other hand show a very different picture in every
respect. In their case Budapest and county centres have a positive balance,
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Table 10: Distribution of mobility flows by settlement types by nature of move
(MC, percents).
Previous residence Residence in 1996
Budapest County c. Towns Villages Together
Permanent
Budapest 1 1 5 6 12
County centres 2 3 4 10 19
Towns 3 5 6 11 25
Villages 4 9 11 20 44
Together 9 18 25 47 100
Temporary
Budapest 3 7 8 19
County centres 5 4 4 6 19
Towns 8 9 5 6 28
Villages 8 10 8 8 34
Together 21 26 24 28 100
Source: Own calculations from the 1996 Microcensus. Percentages might not add up due to
rounding.
where small towns and villages have a net loss of population through this
channel. Rather than following the distribution of permanent ones, temporar-
ily mobile people head towards different settlement types with equal probabil-
ity. Finally, the characteristic horizontal movement between villages is absent
in this case.
5.2 Individual characteristics
Aggregate trends, spatial distribution, individual motivations and the differ-
ent behaviour of temporary and permanent migrants outline a structure that is
characterised by considerable heterogeneity. Without aiming to model this,
it is important to understand its nature so that erroneous inference can be
avoided. To strengthen our intuition about peculiar individual motivations,
such as schooling, marriage or suburban relocation, I turn now to the descript-
ive analysis of individual characteristics.
Ideally, we would like to use exogenous characteristics or preferences to
analyse mobility behaviour but as the data available is retrospective, these are
rare. In fact the only ones are age, gender, and – after constraining age and
supposing no schooling after that – education. In addition, I include status
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Figure 2: Age distributions of mobile and non-mobile people (label refers to
closest curve)
movers
total population
RDS
MC
total population
permanent movers
temporary movers
Source: RDS and the MC. Kernel density estimates smoothed over with cubic splines.
within the family as it sheds light on motivations that are above the individual
level. Both the RDS and the MC are used for this purpose.
Whatever is the reason for mobility, it is certainly an undertaking that
29
Table 11: Schooling of the mobile population (percents)
MC RDS
non-mobile permanent temporary non-mobile mobile
Less than 2 2 1 3 2
Primary 23 22 13 22 22
Vocational 35 31 22 34 33
Secondary 31 28 43 32 28
Higher 9 16 21 10 15
Together 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Own calculation from the RDS and the MC.
brings a great deal of uncertainty. As moving house is a free decision, the
relevant population is probably fit or feels fit enough for this undertaking.
Figure 2 on the preceding page depicts density estimates of ages for people
who did and who did not change their address. The top panel shows calcu-
lations obtained from the RDS, the bottom one that from the MC, separating
temporary and permanent movers. The first fact is that the distributions for
the non-mobile are very close and so are that of the mobile from the RDS and
the permanent movers from the MC. Contrasting the non-mobile population,
the mode for the mobile is unique at around 28 years, tails descending rapidly
towards both directions. The MC reveals a hump at younger ages, hinting at
mobility of relatively young families with small children. Temporary movers
are again different as their mode is at a lower, 24 years of age level and exclude
very young children.
We can compare the schooling of mobile and non-mobile in the 18-40
age bracket where the majority of mobile people are to be found. Table 11
reveals that data from both the MC and the RDS agree on that although still a
relative minority, the proportion of graduates from higher education is about
50 percent higher among the mobile than among the non-mobile.21 Temporary
movers are different in this respect, too, since the proportion of graduates of
higher and even to a greater extent from secondary education is remarkably
high. Together with the seasonality of temporary movers, this corroborates
the hypothesis about temporary movers being largely students or those very
recently graduated.
The distribution of current labour market status in Table 12 reinforces pre-
21This difference remains even if we take only those into account older than 24.
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Table 12: Economic activity of the mobile population (percents)
MC RDS
non-mob. perm. temp. non-mob. mob.
men
Working 68 76 70 67 76
Unemployed 13 13 9 14 14
Maternity leave 0 0 0 0 1
Pensioner 3 2 1 3 2
Full-time
student 6 3 15 10 5
Other 9 6 5 5 3
Together 100 100 100 100 100
women
Working 54 43 50 52 40
Unemployed 8 6 5 10 10
Maternity leave 18 34 15 20 39
Pensioner 3 2 2 2 3
Full-time
student 6 3 19 10 4
Other 11 11 9 7 5
Together 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Own calculation from the RDS and the MC.
vious findings. As gender roles can easily lead to increased specialisation, I
describe men and women separately. Young men who move permanently ap-
pear to be more active (a 10% point advantage) than others and less likely to
be full-time students. Those moving temporarily on the other hand are less
likely to be unemployed but much more to be full-time students than those not
moving at all: as opposed to 6 percent in the reference group, 15 percent of
them falls into this category.
Women are considerably likely to stay at home with children than to work
if changing home permanently. We might suppose thus that in many cases
mobility is endogenous to fertility, either through stricter budget constraints or
the desire to seek a more pleasant surrounding, a bigger home to raise children.
The case of temporary movers shows that the great proportion of students is
not gender-specific.
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The “family building” and study hypotheses are strengthened if we look
at the family status of movers. While the great majority, 70% of permanent
movers is married, the same figure for temporary ones is only 34%. Among
the latter however we find twice as many people cohabiting (20% versus 10%)
and five times more singles (25% percent versus 5%).
5.3 Estimating individual mobility probabilities
To complement and check aggregate findings, I estimate mobility probabilit-
ies at the individual level. I use the MC for this purpose as, although giving a
host of individual-specific information, the RDS does not provide us with the
identity of the sending settlement and would allow only coarse categories to be
created. After some experiments and also for the sake of comparability, I de-
cided that in spite of the already described measurement-error issue in wages,
the chosen geographic unit of analysis is again chosen to be settlements. The
sample size is originally 183,589 with 10,127 people changing address.22 To
focus on the economically most active population, the sample was first restric-
ted to those between 18 and 60 years of age in 1996, giving a total of 111,205
and there are 7,445 mobile persons in total, of which 5,699 are permanent and
1835 are temporary movers.
The actual specification I use is based on equation (1)
Pr[mi¯,j¯,k = 1] = Pr
(
α + β1 E[wi¯,k] + β2 E[wj¯,k] + γ1 E[ui¯,k] + γ2 E[uj¯,k]
+ ηZk + D¯i + D¯j+ ≥ i¯,k + j¯,k
)
. (1∗)
The outcome variable is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the place of
living coincided in 1990 and 1996 and zero otherwise. On the right-hand
side, three sets of regressors are included. One refers to settlements, and is an
estimate in the case of wages only, otherwise data come from administrative
records. Variables for both receiving and sending regions are included —
marked with 1990 and 1996, respectively — to avoid artificially constraining
parameters. We have seen that using average wage of the sending region was
appropriate in the aggregate framework, but is no longer so in the individual
case. That I nevertheless use it is a constraint of available data, not a theoretical
consideration.23
22Those not born in 1990 yet are excluded from the sample all together.
23We have therefore two measurement errors in wages. The first comes from approximating
settlement-level wages with wages of micro-regions and the second from approximating indi-
vidual wages with expected wages.
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The second set of regressors are individual characteristics. Based on de-
scriptive results, these are indicators of age and schooling. Knowing the exact
time of the move and personal characteristics at that time would allow for a
richer specification. Ex-post demographic characteristics however are likely
to be endogenous and are thus excluded.24 Finally the third set of variables
are indicators for counties and types of settlements crossed and also as main
effects. These are included to control for amenities and other fixed effects, just
as in the case of the aggregate model. As we do not observe the exact times of
moving house, indicators for time-effects are missing.25
The estimates for this and further specifications are shown in Table 13 on
the facing page. For clarity and easier comparison to previous results, the table
does not show the probit parameters, but impacts of a unit change in variables
on mobility propensity. The underlying parameters for all models are provided
in a similar fashion in Table 17 of Appendix B on page 43.
Results for people in the potentially active age band are shown in the upper
half of table 17 on page 45, the first column referring to all of them. The estim-
ated sensitivities of the mobility decision has the signs we expect. Increasing
unemployment in the sending and decreasing in the receiving region encour-
ages mobility. The magnitudes in the parameter pairs are very different, but we
can reject their equality at all conventional significance level. Although estim-
ates for earnings take the expected sign as well, the parameter on the sending
region is not significant and its point estimate is much smaller compared to
that of the receiving one, indicating the presence of the measurement error.
The effect of schooling and age is the same that we have seen in Table 11 on
page 29 and in Figure 2 on page 28. People with college degree are much
more likely to move than others, with the propensity decreasing monotonic-
ally towards less education. Advances in age decreases mobility propensity
increasingly.
Having seen the differences between temporary and permanent movers, I
re-estimated the equation for both subsets. In the case of permanent movers,
the qualitative results are similar to the overall ones, although the actual es-
timates are lower. The major difference is that those with secondary education
and in the second age-bracket are not significantly different from those in the
24This and the problem of unobserved heterogeneity can be treated if individual panel data is
available, such as in Böheim and Taylor (1999).
25Also note that although we have data on both the sending and the receiving region, the estim-
ation still refers to the second stage of the decision process. Estimating the probability of mobility,
it is not possible to include variables that vary only trivially among movers and non-movers. A
prime example of this is the distance between the sending and receiving region, a popular and
important variable in gravity models.
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Table 13: Estimates of impacts on individual mobility probability without restrictions
All Permanent Temporary
18 ≤ age ≤ 60
Unemp. rate 1990 0.2466∗∗ (3.18) 0.1374∗ (2.14) 0.0728 (2.46)
Unemp. rate 1996 −0.3208∗∗ (−3.96) −0.1753∗∗ (−2.64) −0.1262 (−3.54)
Avrg. earnings 1990 −0.0017 (−1.13) −0.0014 (−0.73) −0.0003 (−0.56)
Avrg. earnings 1996 0.0057∗∗ (3.78) 0.0044∗∗ (3.23) 0.0007 (1.17)
Compl. pri. school 0.0068 (1.45) 0.0022 (0.61) 0.0061 (2.18)
Vocat. sec. school 0.0071 (1.48) 0.0026 (0.73) 0.0077 (2.64)
Secondary school 0.0250∗∗ (4.99) 0.0094∗ (2.42) 0.0183 (5.53)
College 0.0781∗∗ (11.89) 0.0464∗∗ (8.94) 0.0372 (7.72)
Age: 25-39 −0.0067∗∗ (−3.53) 0.0012 (0.74) −0.0061 (−8.19)
Age: 40-60 −0.0680∗∗ (−32.35) −0.0480∗∗ (−26.21) −0.0148 (−17.05)
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.08 0.13
30 ≤ age ≤ 60
Unemp. rate 1990 0.2277∗∗ (2.57) 0.1528∗∗ (2.12) 0.0607∗ (1.93)
Unemp. rate 1996 −0.2756∗∗ (−3.05) −0.1713∗∗ (−2.32) −0.0959∗∗ (−2.87)
Avrg. earnings 1990 0.0006 (0.39) 0.0003 (0.46) −0.0001 (−0.17)
Avrg. earnings 1996 0.0025 (1.54) 0.0022 (1.42) 0.0003 (0.44)
Compl. pri. school −0.0015 (−0.42) −0.0037 (−1.21) 0.0043∗ (2.04)
Vocat. sec. school 0.0015 (0.38) −0.0023 (−0.71) 0.0080∗∗ (3.13)
Secondary school 0.0103∗∗ (2.51) 0.0037 (1.17) 0.0103∗∗ (4.05)
College 0.0355∗∗ (6.99) 0.0193∗∗ (4.85) 0.0217∗∗ (6.11)
Age: 40-60 −0.0396∗∗ (0.94) −0.0278∗∗ (6.41) −0.0029∗∗ (−4.21)
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.08 0.11
Data: 1996 Microcensus. Heteroskedasticity robust asymptotic “t” statistics in parentheses. ∗∗ indicates significant difference from zero at least 1%,
∗ at least at 5% level, while no stars indicate other, higher levels. The impact of the variables are evaluated at the their mean. In the case of binary
indicators, the impact corresponds to a discrete change, not to the derivative proper. The hypothesis that the regressors jointly have explanatory power
is rejected in all cases at all significance levels.
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baseline group. In the case of temporary movers, the role of employment
possibilities are even less important, but wages both on the sending and re-
ceiving end have turned insignificant. Every level of schooling monotonically
increases the probability of mobility and still university degree has the greatest
effect.
As in the case of aggregate, it is worth looking at the economic significance
of the estimates. Although the estimates in Table 13 on the page before do
not show the average effect of the regressors, but their effect at the average
of the variables, they are comparable to the aggregate results. They offer a
similar qualitative conclusions, and the magnitude of the estimates are not
very different. The largest estimates in Table 8 is one third of the largest
estimate here and is similar to the smallest, obtained for temporary movers.
Jumping from the luckiest settlement to the most disadvantaged, our in-
dicators predict much greater changes than before. A 20 percentage point
increase of unemployment rate brings about a 5 percentage point change in
mobility probabilities which is equal to about the range of aggregate mobil-
ity rates. Almost the same applies to earnings. A less extreme change of ten
thousand Forints in the expected earnings at the receiving settlement causes a
change in mobility rate of about 6 percentage points. The real differences are
of course much smaller than these values and what matters is the difference
between the sending and receiving regions. Nevertheless, these parameters
can plausibly generate the heterogeneity observed in the data.
Given that the schooling system mostly follows the hierarchical structure
of settlements, the higher education one wants to take, the greater are the
chances that a change of the place of living is necessary. Not taking this expli-
citly into account, we might confuse schooling with a mobility decision and
conclude mistakenly that those entering or in higher education are more likely
to move house. To control for this effect, I restricted the sample further. Tak-
ing people aged at least 24 in 1990 probably excludes almost everyone who
moved in connection with studies. After tightening the age limits, the sample
size is 77,532 with 2657 permanent and 755 temporary movers. The results
for this sample are shown in the lower part of Table 13. Although there are nu-
meric differences, the signs and magnitudes of most estimates remain constant
and the qualitative results are unchanged.26
Up to this point I gathered evidences supporting the idea that differences
26I experimented with a restricted sample to estimate the above equations for migrants only,
crossing the boundaries of counties. Unfortunately after including only those who moved across
regions, the sample size did not allow the identification of parameters with any acceptable preci-
sion.
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Table 14: Estimates of impacts on individual mobility probabilities (full
sample with restrictions place of work)
No back-commuting Back-commuting
Unemp. rate 1990 0.2410∗∗ (3.30) −0.1563∗∗ (−3.01)
Unemp. rate 1996 −0.2845∗∗ (−3.66) 0.1282∗∗ (2.65)
Avrg. earnings 1990 0.0001 (0.10) −0.0003 (−0.50)
Avrg. earnings 1996 0.0030∗ (2.02) 0.0004 (0.77)
Compl. pri. school 0.0028 (0.65) 0.0108∗∗ (3.31)
Vocat. sec. school 0.0005 (0.12) 0.0152∗∗ (3.76)
Secondary school 0.0160∗∗ (3.50) 0.0172∗∗ (4.12)
College 0.0637∗∗ (10.58) 0.0378∗∗ (4.82)
Age: 25-39 −0.0089∗∗ (−5.06) 0.0014∗∗ (3.15)
Age: 40-60 −0.0653∗∗ (−32.75) −0.0009∗ (−2.15)
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.49
Data: 1996 Microcensus. Heteroskedasticity robust asymptotic “t” statistics in parentheses. ∗∗
indicates significant difference from zero at least 1%, ∗ at least at 5% level, while no stars indicate
other, higher levels. The impact of the variables are evaluated at the their mean. In the case
of binary indicators, the impact corresponds to a discrete change, not to the derivative proper.
The hypothesis that the regressors jointly have explanatory power is rejected in all cases at all
significance levels.
in labour market opportunities do influence the decision about mobility. Al-
though the individual-level data do not extend beyond 1997, we have seen
that suburbanisation was a strong phenomenon already before that time. In
some cases suburbs can be economically developed, but as they are mostly
residential areas with only minimal local business, this usually is not the case.
If a substantial proportion of people moving to suburbs rely on their pre-
vious place of living and suburbs offer labour market opportunities inferior to
that of centres, labour market possibilities alone are expected to have a per-
verse effect. Since we know the place of living as well as that of work (if any)
for every individual, we can identify people who commute back to their pre-
vious place of living. Table 14 gives estimates firstly for movers without this
subgroup leaving 9,318, and secondly for them alone, with only 809 “mobile”
persons.
Results from the split sample is in line with our previous findings about
the effect of suburbanisation. While it is not possible to precisely identify re-
sponses to earnings differences, parameter estimates on unemployment rates
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are relatively precise and interesting. Those for people working in a place dif-
ferent from their previous residence, unemployment shows effects quite sim-
ilar to that in the case of the pooled estimates. Those for the other group
however starkly contrast this result. The parameter of unemployment rate for
both regions are significant, and have a “wrong” sign. Earnings in the send-
ing region stays insignificant, and that in the receiving region not only loses
significance, but is almost indifferent from zero.
6 Conclusions
In this paper I looked at mobility and migration in Hungary between 1990 and
1999 at several levels. Using aggregate as well as individual data, the struc-
ture and large-scale trend of mobility was described, the relevant population
characterised and a simple behavioural model estimated to show and evaluate
the effects of economic incentives.
Mobility in Hungary is among the least frequent in Europe, both com-
pared to the EU or other Central and East European countries. In terms of mi-
gration (long-range mobility) however the country is more comparable to the
European experience. A puzzling fact at first sight is that although labour mar-
ket inequalities increased after the start of real economic growth in 1995, the
trend of mobility followed them only through a brief period, flattening down
by the end of the decade. Aggregate analysis on the other hand established
that the 1990s witnessed a structural change in mobility. The former pattern of
urbanisation was gradually replaced by that of suburbanisation, people mov-
ing mainly from big towns to smaller ones and villages. This phenomenon
explains why the aggregate data seem to contradict conventional wisdom.
To look at economic incentives, I estimated an aggregated version of a
gravity model modified to be used with only data on outward mobility rates for
individual regions. Results indicate that before 1995, both unemployment and
wage differentials have the expected and significant effect, while after 1995,
this is true only for unemployment. Although the economic significance of
both effect is small, they together are able to explain some of the heterogeneity
found in the data.
Detailed data on individual characteristics allowed to look at the compos-
ition of mobile population closely. Personal attitudes showed that although
economic incentives are an important factor in mobility migration, there are
many other to consider. Using factor analysis, I showed that an increasingly
dominant reason to move is seeking pleasant surrounding. This corroborates
the already established results of the importance on suburbanisation and other,
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non-economic factors.
Aggregate behaviour was shown to be different in the case of temporary
and permanent movers. Temporary movers, about half of the overall mobile
population, contain a possibly large proportion of students, whose movement
seems to follow economic incentives. This is however seem to be the result
of the close connection between the hierarchical structure of the schooling
system and the incidence of higher wages and lower unemployment. While
the pool of temporarily mobile people contains a large proportion of mostly
young, single or cohabiting people without a child or in full time studies, per-
manent movers are different. They are older (but not old or middle-aged), raise
children in many cases, live in families where men are working and women
take care of children in an above-average proportion.
Individual data also allows to re-visit the role of economic incentive in mo-
bility, taking both characteristics of the sending and the receiving settlement
into consideration. Results show similar qualitative properties as the aggregate
case, underlining the important part that labour market opportunities play. Op-
posed to the aggregate findings, these effects prove to be stronger and — along
with individual characteristics — capable to generate the observed heterogen-
eity. The difference between the two estimates can be explained by the effect
of aggregation. The results are robust to a number of scrutinies. They also
show that although there is a large number of movers whose behaviour can
be captured by the underlying simple model, this is not true for the suburban
dwellers whose importance is increasing.
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A Data Appendix
The data at my disposal consists of settlement level and individual inform-
ation. The two main data sources are the settlement-level TSTAR and the
individual-level Microcensus. These are complemented by wage data from
the Wage Survey and unemployment data from the registers of the National
Labour Centre.
A.1 TSTAR
TSTAR27, a comprehensive database contains administrative information on
more than 3,100 Hungarian settlements. Data is available on a variety of
topics including demographics and the number of persons moving into and
out from the settlement, regardless whether it is a temporary or a permanent
change. One shortcoming of these data is that, due to the constantly changing
definitions of concepts and scope of data-gathering at governmental offices,
time-series that span a whole decade are not possible in the case of most vari-
ables.
The TSTAR is not a panel database of the settlements. To fix their status,
settlements spun off from another one or created by a split are put back to-
gether and treated in the form as they existed in 1990. This reduces their
number to 3,070. Using this database, a panel is created with selected vari-
ables.
Table 15: Summary statistics for variables used in aggregate estimation, set-
tlements over 1992-2000
obs. mean std. deviation min. max.
Mobility outflow rate 1350 4.2 0.8 2.3 7.9
Unemployment rate 1200 12.7 4.6 2.9 30.2
Earningsa 1050 18.8 3.6 11.6 36.2
aThousand Forints, 1992 prices. Real variation only across micro-regions.
27TSTAR is a Hungarian acronym for “Településsoros Statisztikai Adatbázis Rendszer”,
Settlement-level Statistical Database System, created at the Institute of Economic, Hungarian
Academy of Science with the Hungarian Central Statistics Office from different sources.
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A.2 Microcensus
The “Microcensus” (MC) is a large representative sample of the population
that provides extensive information on around 200 thousand individuals, their
homes and households. Answering this survey is mandatory, so there is vir-
tually no bias from nonresponse (but due to discrepancies between the popu-
lation registry and reality, the sample is weighted). In the MC, we know the
identity of the settlement where people lived in 1990 and 1996, but we do
not know what happened in the meantime and have no information on past
characteristics of the respondents.
Omitting children who were not yet born in 1990, the sample size is 183,589
with 10,127 movers. Constraining age to the 18-60 years of age band, we are
left with 111,205 observations, of which 7,445 are movers. 5,699 of them
are permanent and 1835 are temporary movers. Taking only people over 30
years of age into consideration, we have 77,532 observations, with 2657 per-
manent and 755 temporary movers. Looking at the effect of back-commuting
to previous place of living, I excluded those who do (809) and those who do
not (9,318) commute back. Thus excluded were eliminated from the sample
altogether.
Mobility here is defined as living in different settlements in 1990 and
1996. This means that repeated movers and those moving only once during the
period are both counted only once, but movers returning to a previous address
never. Masking repeated and temporary moves will bias the fraction of movers
and possibly weaken signs of the relations we are interested in. Nevertheless
if the moves are time-consistent and every choice dominates a previous one,
the signs of the relations should not be affected.
A.3 Regional Development Survey
The “Regional Development Survey” (RDS) of the Szonda Ipsos market re-
search company elicited questions on individuals’ living circumstances and
reasons for moving house. The sample size is 26,800 with 1200 observation
from every county except from Budapest, where 4,000 interviews took place.
Because of the disproportionate sampling and possibility of nonresponse, the
data is weighted.
Movers here are defined as those not having born in the present settlement
of residence. Out of the 26,736 respondents of the RDS, only a little more
than half of the sample (57%) was born at the current place of living and
about 1 percent moved in from abroad. The subsample without these people
and the 200 moving house within Budapest will be designated as “movers”
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(also excluding those without a date of relocation), a total of 11,344.
In the RDS, we do not know the identity of the sending settlement, just its
type and to every type its rough relation to the current place of living (“far”,
“close”), which makes it unsuitable to estimate individual mobility propensit-
ies. The benefit here is that the year of moving house the last time is known,
so it is possible to trace the change of motivations over time and relate those
to aggregate observations. Also here we have a departure from the definition
of mobility used in the aggregate data. Here we record moving in every year,
but only the last one for everybody. This means that a yearly snapshot will
include all movers conditional on staying at the new residence and the most
frequent mover somebody is, the latter he or she is recorded.
A.4 Auxiliary data sources
I impute wage and unemployment data from auxiliary data sources. For the
former, I use the available waves of the Wage Survey, comprising years 1992,
1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999. This is a sample of around 150
thousand workers from firms with more than 11 employees, providing high
quality payroll wage data. The number of observations makes it feasible to
estimate the mean wage for the 150 small regions, but not for smaller units.
Unemployment figures refer to the number of registered unemployed, com-
ing from records of the National Labour Centre (“OMK”) and are valid on the
settlement level. Lacking real time-series on the number of active persons, we
use two feasible measures, the number of active persons in 1990 (known from
the Census) and the number of persons in active age (18-59 years old men
and 18-54 years old women) registered in the TSTAR database. Estimation
using both measures revealed that the choice between them does not have any
important influence on the results.
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B Complementary tables and maps
Table 16: Relative mobility gains of agglomeration centres
County Settlement Relative gain
1990-1992 1998-2000
Budapest Budapest 0.37% −1.19%
Baranya Pécs 0.41% −0.63%
Bács-Kiskun Kecskemét 0.66% 0.35%
Békés Békéscsaba 0.26% −0.27%
Békés Békés −0.16% −0.45%
Békés Csabaszabadi 0.26% −0.27%
Békés Gyula 0.61% 0.32%
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén Kazincbarcika −1.27% −1.70%
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén Miskolc −0.79% −0.94%
Csongrád Szeged 0.67% −0.77%
Fejér Székesfehérvár 0.03% −0.48%
Gyo˝r-Moson-Sopron Sopron 0.64% 0.27%
Gyo˝r-Moson-Sopron Gyo˝r 0.24% −0.01%
Hajdú-Bihar Debrecen 0.57% −0.83%
Heves Eger 0.71% −1.20%
Komárom-Esztergom Komárom 0.31% 0.64%
Komárom-Esztergom Tata −0.72% −0.04%
Komárom-Esztergom Tatabánya −0.27% −0.01%
Komárom-Esztergom Lábatlan −0.68% −0.28%
Komárom-Esztergom Nyergesújfalu −0.38% −0.42%
Komárom-Esztergom Dorog 0.54% 0.44%
Komárom-Esztergom Esztergom 0.07% 0.48%
Komárom-Esztergom Oroszlány −0.20% 0.01%
Nógrád Salgótarján −0.51% −0.88%
Pest Gyál 1.44% 2.36%
Pest Gyömro˝ 0.63% 3.12%
Pest Pécel 0.91% 3.51%
Pest Gödöllo˝ 0.88% 0.93%
Pest Kistarcsa 0.48% 1.30%
Pest Fót 1.59% 2.54%
Pest Dunakeszi 1.38% 1.08%
Pest Vác −0.06% −0.21%
Pest Szigetszentmiklós 0.49% 4.03%
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Table 16: Relative mobility gains of agglomeration centres
County Settlement Relative gain
1990-1992 1998-2000
Pest Százhalombatta −0.83% 1.28%
Pest Érd 0.95% 3.47%
Pest Budaörs 1.65% 1.71%
Pest Budakeszi 0.38% 1.90%
Pest Piliscsaba 1.40% 3.27%
Pest Pilisvörösvár 0.75% 2.17%
Pest Szentendre 1.77% 2.59%
Pest Pilisjászfalu 1.40% 3.27%
Pest Kerepes 0.48% 1.30%
Pest Dunaharaszti 0.55% 2.01%
Somogy Balatonfenyves 0.44% 0.95%
Somogy Fonyód 0.44% 0.95%
Somogy Balatonboglár 0.51% 1.34%
Somogy Balatonlelle 0.51% 1.34%
Somogy Balatonföldvár 0.63% 0.02%
Somogy Siófok 0.15% 0.35%
Somogy Kaposvár −0.26% −0.20%
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg Nyíregyháza −0.01% −0.35%
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok Szolnok 0.56% −1.25%
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok Törökszentmiklós −0.35% −0.50%
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok Martfu˝ 0.36% −1.17%
Tolna Szekszárd 0.17% −0.58%
Vas Ko˝szeg 0.36% −0.58%
Vas Szombathely 0.00% −0.74%
Veszprém Balatonalmádi 0.88% 1.02%
Veszprém Veszprém 0.28% −1.92%
Veszprém Várpalota −0.51% 0.18%
Veszprém Ajka −0.59% −1.00%
Veszprém Balatonfüred 0.72% 0.17%
Zala Zalaegerszeg 0.24% −0.78%
Zala Keszthely 0.12% −0.87%
Zala Nagykanizsa −0.45% −0.56%
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Table 17: Probit parameter estimates in a model of individual mobility probabilities
All Permanent Temporary
17 ≤ age ≤ 60 0
Unemp. rate 1990 2.13∗∗ (3.18) 1.51∗ (2.14) 2.45∗∗ (2.46)
Unemp. rate 1996 −2.78∗∗ (−3.96) −1.92∗∗ (−2.64) −4.25∗∗ (−3.54)
Avrg. earnings 1990 −0.01 (−1.13) −0.01 (−0.73) −0.01 (−0.56)
Avrg. earnings 1996 0.05∗∗ (3.78) 0.05∗∗ (3.23) 0.02 (1.17)
Compl. pri. school 0.06 (1.45) 0.02 (0.61) 0.19∗∗ (2.18)
Vocat. sec. school 0.06 (1.48) 0.03 (0.73) 0.23∗∗ (2.64)
Secondary school 0.20∗∗ (4.99) 0.10∗ (2.42) 0.47∗∗ (5.53)
Higher 0.50∗∗ (11.89) 0.40∗∗ (8.94) 0.68∗∗ (7.72)
Age: 25-39 −0.06∗∗ (−3.53) 0.01 (0.74) −0.22∗∗ (−8.19)
Age: 40-60 −0.60∗∗ (−32.35) −0.53∗∗ (−26.21) −0.50∗∗ (−17.05)
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.08 0.14
30 ≤ age ≤ 60, no students
Unemp. rate 1990 2.73∗∗ (2.57) 2.32∗∗ (2.12) 2.97∗ (1.93)
Unemp. rate 1996 −3.31∗∗ (−3.05) −2.60∗∗ (−2.32) −4.70∗∗ (−2.87)
Avrg. earnings 1990 0.00 (0.39) 0.01 (0.46) −0.00 (−0.17)
Avrg. earnings 1996 0.03 (1.54) 0.03 (1.42) 0.01 (0.44)
Compl. pri. school −0.02 (−0.42) −0.06 (−1.21) 0.19∗ (2.04)
Vocat. sec. school 0.02 (0.38) −0.03 (−0.71) 0.31∗∗ (3.13)
Secondary school 0.12∗∗ (2.51) 0.06 (1.17) 0.39∗∗ (4.05)
Higher 0.34∗∗ (6.99) 0.25∗∗ (4.85) 0.60∗∗ (6.11)
Age: 40-60 0.41∗∗ (0.94) −0.46∗∗ (6.41) −0.13∗∗ (−4.21)
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.08 0.11
Data: 1996 Microcensus. Heteroskedasticity robust asymptotic “t” statistics in parentheses. ∗∗ indicates significant difference from zero at least 1%,
∗ at least at 5% level, while no stars indicate other, higher levels. The hypothesis that the regressors jointly have explanatory power is rejected in all
cases at all significance levels.
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Table 18: Probit parameter estimates in a model of individual mobility prob-
abilities
No back-commuting Back-commuting
Unemp. rate 1990 2.29∗∗ (3.30) −20.86∗∗ (−3.01)
Unemp. rate 1996 −2.71∗∗ (−3.66) 17.12∗∗ (2.65)
Avrg. earnings 1990 0.00 (0.10) −0.04 (−0.50)
Avrg. earnings 1996 0.03∗ (2.02) 0.06 (0.77)
Compl. pri. school 0.03 (0.65) 0.80∗∗ (3.31)
Vocat. sec. school 0.00 (0.12) 0.92∗∗ (3.76)
Secondary school 0.14∗∗ (3.50) 1.00∗∗ (4.12)
College 0.45∗∗ (10.58) 1.19∗∗ (4.82)
Age: 40-60 −0.09∗∗ (−5.06) 0.17∗∗ (3.15)
Age: 40-60 −0.63∗∗ (−32.75) 0.12∗ (−2.15)
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.49
Data: 1996 Microcensus. Heteroskedasticity robust asymptotic “t” statistics in parentheses. ∗∗
indicates significant difference from zero at least 1%, ∗ at least at 5% level, while no stars indicate
other, higher levels. The hypothesis that the regressors jointly have explanatory power is rejected
in all cases at all significance levels.
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Figure 3: Agglomeration centres and counties
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Figure 4: Net mobility rates by settlements, 1990-1992
−
16
%
 to
 −
0.
9%
−
0.
9%
 to
 0
%
0%
 to
 0
.9
%
0.
9%
 to
 2
4.
7%
49
Figure 5: Net mobility rates by settlements, 1998-2000
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